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Since the end of the Cold War, America has enjoyed a degree of world supremacy unknown to any other world power for more than a century. American military, political and economic influence is spreading throughout the globe. Scholars and foreign policy elites now regularly debate the once taboo subject of American empire and its impact on national and global affairs. In today's world, the predominance of an empire is no longer measured solely by its territorial reach or holdings. Apart from military capacity, Basevich grasps the importance of globalization to America. He argues that it has had a profound affect on U.S. foreign policy. Beyond economics, globalization is ultimately about power and the opportunity to reconfigure the international order. The nation that leads the globalization race will establish the political and human values under which the rest of the world will live. The pursuit of openness in a globalized world is about Americans doing well first, and others a distant second. Yet, Americans tend to cling to Wilsonian idealism as justification for their involvement in the world. Therefore, according to Basevich, the nation's political elites have sought to hide the implications and purpose of global empire from the public. The promotion of peace, democracy, and human rights and the punishment of bad actors define the essence of American foreign policy, rather than the pursuit of self-interests first through the calculus of national power. If early American historians were concerned that the strategy of openness was actually a design for empire that could lead to the unrestrained use of military power, modern intellectual elites agued that the age of globalization would create an international structure that would obviate the need for war.
Today, Basevich believes that the Department of Defense has transformed into a "Department of Power Projection." America's policy elites believe the nation needs a strong military that is capability based in order to prevail against any combination of adversaries anywhere in the world. Its purpose is to support the strategy of openness not simply to protect America's interests, but to promote those interests actively on a global scale.
Basevich argues that since the end of the Cold War, regardless of the rhetoric between democrats and republicans, U.S. administrations have maintained the same clearly defined national security policy consisting of four distinct but related imperatives.
First is "the imperative of America's mission as the vanguard of history, transforming the global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its own dominance." Second is "the imperative of openness and integration, given impetus by globalization but guided by the United States." Third is "is the imperative of American global leadership expressed by maintaining U.S. preeminence in each of the world's strategically significant regions."
Today leadership has become a euphemism for the nation's political elite, a codeword for empire. The fourth imperative is "the imperative of military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity and projected globally."
Finally, Basevich argues that the self-delusional idea that America is by its very nature innocent of imperial pretensions has become untenable and counterproductive because "it impedes the efforts to gauge realistically the challenges facing the United
States as a liberal democracy intent on presiding over a global order in which American values and American power enjoy pride of place." America has established dominance in several regions of geopolitical importance, recognizes only the legitimacy of its own economic principles, has declared the inviolability of the existing order, and has established unquestioned military dominance with a globally deployed force configured not for self-defense but for coercion. "These are the actions of a nation engaged in the governance of empire." America has created an informal empire and in so doing acquired an imperial problem. This fact is not a matter for celebration, nor should it be denied.
In Carnage and Culture, Hanson writes of nine battles that illustrate the lethality of the Western way of war. In each of these battles aspects of the Western way of war are developed: emphasis on decisive battle, the tenacity of constitutional states, reliance on heavy infantry, discipline and leadership, and technological power. He also proposes that the superiority of Western weaponry was itself no accident but the result of a unique cultural tradition that sanctioned intellectual, political, and economic freedom. The
Western cultural phenomenon of rationalism, free inquiry, the dissemination of knowledge, free markets, protection of contracts, capitalism, private property, and the rule of law created an environment in which scientific discovery, application, and innovation were encouraged and rewarded. Furthermore, Western markets, unlike nonWestern markets, were capable of mass-producing weapons of war.
Is war a more natural condition than peace for the human race? It is interesting to note that freedom, democracy, and capitalism enable the Western way of war, which becomes the tool for ensuring the dominance of Western culture. Today, to ensure the dominance of Western culture, America preserves and advances its economic capacity for growth through the expansion of capital markets and democracy. Non-West cultures that do not wish to participate in the American ideal will resist. Obstacles to the advancement of American dominated Western cultural strategic interests will be removed, as a last resort, by the decisive capability of its military. Global competition between political, religious, and economic ideas ensures conflict for the foreseeable future.
Hanson argues that the deadly Western military tradition was handed down from the Greeks, to the Romans, and was adopted by the German-Celtic tribes of Northern
Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. Western martial tradition preferred decisive shock battle, civic militarism, heavily armed infantry, wellprotected warriors, tactical sophistication, discipline, and training. Civic militarism meant consensual government, civilian control and audit of the military, declarations of war by elected assemblies, and the practice of mustering free, propertied males to fill the ranks. Free men who are defending their own homes and liberties make better soldiers than those who possess no rights and are fighting for a distant ruling class or empire in which they are mere subjects. Furthermore, free men demonstrate a disciplined bravery, initiative, and adaptability in hard-fought battles that has proved decisive.
Hanson provides a point of interest for America today as it tries to impose its culture on non-Western peoples. He notes that hundreds of years of Greek rule failed to westernize the peoples of Western Asia, just as hundreds of years of Roman rule failed to westernize their North African and Middle Eastern populations. Alternately, the European populations absorbed the best of Greco-Roman culture.
For those who see globalization, rationalism, capitalism, and democracy as the seeds for peace and prosperity, Hanson warns that we "must remember that these ideas are also the foundations that have created the world's deadliest armies of the past."
Byproducts of these deadliest armies-weapons of mass destruction copied by potential non-West adversaries-worry Hanson as he contemplates the future.
The synthesis of these two books provides strategic clarity for America's complex security environment. Today, in the era of globalization, America leads a global war on terrorism. However, the war is not just about a threat to America's physical security. It is also about the threat to America's cultural viability-economic, political, and military.
The war is an extension of the American policy of openness. The war is about creating new and stable markets for America and the world and preserving the ones that already exist.
America is an empire that spans the globe. American empire is not like the old Roman imperium. Rather, it is one in which America dominates world events, like it or not, in many ways. America's military is far superior to any other and the gap is widening. The American ideal of freedom and democracy-its culture-is felt the world over, and it is unsettling to dictators who live off the suffering of their people.
Democratic, market-oriented governments led by America, have done more for their people than any other form of government in history. America is not perfect, but neither should it apologize for the American ideal, which is unique in the history of nations. Nor should America continue to pretend that it is not an empire. It should embrace public debate on the application and national and global implications of its imperium.
American foreign policy is, and always has been, motivated by its self-interests first, rather than larger humanitarian interests. America has been the guarantor of Europe's peace and stability since WW II. It provides the same for the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East and Gulf region, and North and Southeast Asia. America involved itself in the Balkans to preserve NATO, to ensure its leadership in European affairs, and to preserve the economic viability of the region. America is involved in the Middle East and Gulf region because of the strategic importance that region holds to the world economy, to prevent the proliferation of WMD and terrorists groups that would use them against U.S. interests, and to promote freedom and democracy within the region.
Globalization has changed the security environment in an unprecedented and lasting way. If President Clinton was the first American president to embrace globalism, its opportunities and challenges, he will not be the last. Every U.S. administration from
Teddy Roosevelt to the current Bush administration has maintained the same fundamental foreign policy design for national security-to promote freedom and democracy and the expansion of markets for U.S. economic growth. Every new U.S.
administration may have campaigned on the foreign policy failings of the previous one, but when the new administration took office, it embraced much of the same fundamental foreign policy objectives of its predecessor. President Clinton's national security strategy was one of engagement and enlargement. If the current Bush administration campaigned on being less involved globally, it soon realized upon seizing the reigns of power that it could not do so. That is why, all the rhetoric aside, the Bush administration foreign policy looks remarkably similar to the Clinton administration's.
Today, America engages the world diplomatically, economically, and militarily in order to enlarge the pool of democratic governments, free people and capital markets. However, America should not hold its future hostage to the hopes of idealism for its own sake indefinitely. As the dominant leader in world affairs, knowing when to act decisively is important. Having coercive or deterrent credibility means demonstrating the will and capacity to act when necessary. Others may not like it and they will complain.
Nevertheless, they will respect it.
Hanson demonstrates that the Western way of war has been dominant throughout history and that free peoples embracing market economies and exercising democratic government have fueled this military dominance. Basevich demonstrates that within this construct of Western culture, and at the end of the 20 th century, America alone has established imperial dominance not by accident, but by a predetermined and longstanding foreign policy of openness. As Basevich states, America today is "committed irreversibly to the maintenance and, where feasible, expansion of an empire that differs from every other empire in history." The question now is one of American willingness to accept the responsibilities of empire and its future. When American policymakers abandon the idealistic illusion of American innocence and present the issue to the American people for debate, the answers will come.
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